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Climate change policy decisions are inescapably intertwined with future generations. Even if all 
carbon dioxide emissions were to be stopped today, most aspects of climate change would persist 
for hundreds of years. Because of cumulative emissions, seas will continue to warm for centuries, 
and 15 to 40 per cent of emitted CO2 continue to contribute to warming for more than a millennium 
(IPCC 2013, 25–6). Anthropogenic climate change thus inevitably raises questions of 
intergenerational justice and sustainability. The most famous definition of sustainability comes from 
the Brundtland Report, which defines it as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.2 It is clear that climate 
change poses a serious risk to sustainability. Climate change puts ecosystems under severe stress 
through increased climate-extremes such as floods, droughts, heat waves and cyclones, and affects 
crop yields, usually negatively. Melting snow and ice and changing precipitation alter hydrological 
systems, affecting the quantity and quality of water resources. All of this affects the poor 
disproportionately, both now and in the future, as they are more vulnerable to climate shocks (IPCC 
2014a). Sustainability thus has a strong intra-generational justice aspect to it also, but this chapter 
will concentrate on the intergenerational side.3  
 
While debates around sustainability have been going on for decades, and are perhaps already 
considered old news in some fields, the concept is very relevant to climate ethics and economics. 
This chapter argues that since not all natural capital is substitutable, we should invest in mitigation 
efforts. Climate policies focused mainly on adaptation are not acceptable, although adaptation 
measures have their role to play, especially as compensatory measures. The role of economics is 
very prominent in political discussions around climate change mitigation and adaptation. Therefore, 
to tackle justice issues effectively, one must also look into the ethical assumptions included in 
economic analyses. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report includes 
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for the first time discussion on how justice questions could be brought into economic calculations 
that feed into policy recommendations (IPCC 2014b). It is not an easy task, but an essential one. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section begins with a short overview of discount rate 
debate in climate economics, followed by the observation that discounting implicitly makes the 
assumption that natural capital is always substitutable with man-made capital (Holland 1995; 
Neumayer 1999, 2007, 2013; Spash 1993). The following section explores the role of 
substitutability in discussions around sustainability, and explains why non-substitutability matters if 
we are to take intergenerational justice seriously and invest aptly in mitigation. Non-substitutability 
simply implies that there are some forms of capital that cannot be substituted by another, and so 
consumption of one cannot be compensated with additional stocks of the other. The non-
substitutability of critical natural capital can be defended without empirical data about preferences 
or the need to view the environment as a superior good, and the argument is presented through the 
language of keeping options open. The fourth section anticipates likely objections and tries to 
clarify the essence of the debate on sustainability. Those alive today make decisions about what 
natural capital to use and what to save for future. These choices are often represented as different 
points in a continuum of sustainability: weak sustainability is associated with a high degree of 
substitutability and therefore a lot of flexibility over what capital to consume, whereas strong 
sustainability is more stringent on substitutability. While it may be that in economical 
understanding weak and strong sustainability collapse into one another, philosophically the 
emphasis is slightly different. Section five discusses how normative sustainability can be supported 
without ignoring opportunity costs and trade-offs. Section six concludes.  
 
 
Discounting and its implicit acceptance of substitutability  
 
Discounting is a tool in economics that allows effects occurring at different future times to be 
compared. Due to the cumulative and long-term nature of the problem of climate change, future 
generations inevitably have to be incorporated into climate economists’ models. There is an 
inherent intergenerational tension, as future populations will bear the environmental cost of today’s 
emissions, while a large part of the current population benefits from the industrial activities 
contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, people in the future will reap the benefits of 
mitigation efforts, while the current generation bear the costs, as mitigation efforts mean allocating 
resources away from other things. When economists make cost–benefit analyses to weight these 
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options, they utilise discount rates to compare the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation 
policies that arise at different times. In discounting, all aggregate costs and benefits are expressed in 
terms of their present value first. Then discounted values are compared to each other, so that a 
policy is considered desirable if its net present value is positive.  
 
Discounting is traditionally justified with the assertion that present utility counts more than future 
utility. In economics, future generations are also assumed to be better off than we are. For example, 
Geoffrey Brennan (2007: 277–80) argues that, on average, each generation over the past 300 years 
or so has systematically done better than its predecessors, mainly through gaining socially robust 
institutions and an ever-increasing stock of knowledge.4 I remain sceptical of the growth optimism, 
especially with the possibility of runaway climate change scenarios. In any case, just because the 
material conditions and medical care of the average person has improved vastly in the past few 
hundred years, taking a bird’s-eye view of history gives us no real assurance that this is a trend that 
will definitely continue.5 Importantly, even if economic growth were to continue, it does not mean 
that it would translate to the benefit of those at the bottom of the ladder, even in the future. 
However, for the sake of the argument, reservations about this assumption will be left aside for the 
remainder of the chapter as it is not the only problematic one in discounting, as we will soon see.  
 
The exact value of the discount rate has ethical implications, as it determines how the consequences 
of mitigation are distributed between generations. When payoffs are in the distant future, seemingly 
insignificant differences in discount rates can make an enormous difference. This has led Martin 
Weitzman (2012: 309–10) to argue that it may not be too much of an exaggeration to say that, in 
climate economics, almost any answer to a cost–benefit analysis question can be defended by the 
choice of a discount rate. To give a prominent example, the 2006 Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change (Stern 2007) utilised a low discount rate (1.4 per cent per year) and concluded 
that we should take immediate action to reduce emission, whereas Nordhaus’s (2008) analysis 
assumed a higher discount rate (around 5.5 per cent per year) and reached the conclusion that only a 
mild reduction in the short term followed by more significant reduction in the mid-term were 
economically desirable. The choice of discount rate thus leads to differences in policy 
recommendations regarding mitigation and adaptation. The majority of debates on climate ethics 
and economics have thus unsurprisingly centred on the discount rate chosen (in addition to Stern 
and Nordhaus, see also Azar and Sterner 19966; Brennan 2007; Broome 19927, 1994; Dasgupta 
2007; Weitzman 2012).  
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Eric Neumayer (1999: 39) argues that attacking the discount rate ignores the real problem: the 
premise of perfect substitutability – that natural capital is always substitutable by human capital – 
which “is the implicit underlying theoretical foundation for discounting”. Alan Holland (1995) had 
observed similarly a few years earlier that one of the framework assumptions implicit in cost– 
benefit analysis is the homogenising of value and preferences: you cannot compare environmental 
goods with other goods without a common measure of value. Holland notices that if we are to bring 
environmental goods into the (hypothetical) market, it amounts to pronouncing them substitutable 
(others to have discussed substitutability include Spash 1993 and Gardiner 2004). To give an 
example of how the empirical assumption of natural capital being substitutable by human capital is 
implicit in discounting, Nordhaus’s dynamic optimisation economic growth model meshes together 
benefits and costs as shares of total output, regardless of whether they are about consumption or 
connected to environmental amenities. Neumayer argues that this is the first of two closely related 
ways in which the model implicitly assumes substitutability. The other is that material costs and 
benefits can substitute for environmental costs and benefits, which is implicitly assumed in the way 
Nordhaus discounts the future. The model utilises Ramsey’s (1928) formula for discounting where 
the discount rate relates to the growth rate of consumption: future counts less as future generations 
are presumed to be better off due to increased consumption, so increased consumption is implicitly 
assumed to perfectly compensate for losses in environmental amenities. (Neumayer 1999, 35–7, 
2013: 31–4; Nordhaus 2008).  
 
According to Neumayer (2007, 300–1), the Stern Review missed the opportunity to build a more 
persuasive case for current generations to take immediate, decisive action on climate change 
mitigation, as it was too easy for critics to point out that the Review’s central message is decisively 
dependent on the discount rate used. Rather than focusing on the low discount rate and possible 
substantial losses of output, Neumayer argues that the non-substitutability argument could have 
provided a much stronger case for the measures recommended by the Review. This is because even 
in the Review’s worst-case scenario, people living in 2200 are assumed to be eight times better off 
than present generations. In contrast, the non-substitutability argument draws attention to how 
future generations are harmed by climate change in a way that consumption growth just cannot 
compensate for.  
 
While Neumayer is seemingly correct in criticising the Stern Review for failing to explicitly 
problematise the assumption of substitutability, he lacks the apparatus to make his argument 
persuasive. This is because Neumayer (1999: 41–2) concludes that favouring non-substitutability 
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over “perfect substitutability” is “a matter of belief”8 at the end of the day, even though “a 
persuasive case” can be made for the preservation of some (especially life-supporting) forms of 
natural capital, as the likelihood of these being substitutable is slim (Neumayer 2013: 99). He 
continues that as there are no “hard numbers” when it comes to climate change, policies cannot be 
based on them (Neumayer 2013: 44). Economics thus cannot provide a clear answer on what to do 
about climate change, i.e. to invest heavily in mitigation or not, but it can make the choices more 
rational and transparent. It is up to us to decide politically if growth in consumption can compensate 
losses to natural capital. While the question of substitutability of natural capital with human capital 
cannot be settled by economists or philosophers alone, it does not follow that it is a matter of mere 
belief and all is up for grabs within political decision-making process. Instead, the next sections 
demonstrate that a strong case for mitigation can be built based on intergenerational justice.  
 
 
A matter of intergenerational justice  
 
Considerations of intergenerational justice should compel us to invest substantially in mitigation to 
protect critical forms of natural capital at minimum, and to keep as many options open for future 
generations as possible. The idea about freedom of choice in intergenerational justice is of course 
nothing new. Already in 1987 the Brundtland Report argued that as few future options as possible 
should be foreclosed.9 Various arguments have been given to the same effect (in addition to those 
discussed below, see e.g. Beekman 2004; Dobson 2003; Holland 1999; Norton 1999; Norton and 
Toman 1997; Weikard 1999). This is not a problem, as the goal of this chapter is not to present 
some novel argument about intergenerational justice. It is rather to argue that (on a minimal 
account) the non-substitutability of critical natural capital, and the climate change mitigation 
investments which that entails, can be defended without empirical data about preferences or the 
need to view the environment somehow as a superior good.10  
 
Capital is a stock that provides flows of service, both current and future. It comes in various forms: 
natural capital, financial capital, real capital (consumer and investment goods, infrastructure), 
cultural capital (institutions), social capital (social contacts), human capital (abilities and 
knowledge, health) and knowledge capital (non-person-bound knowledge). These categories are not 
absolutely fixed: sometimes it is not possible to give a clear-cut answer whether something is 
human-made or a form of natural capital. For example, with cultivated natural capital such as 
farmlands, the difference between natural and artificial is a matter of degree (Tremmel 2009: 66–7). 
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Despite this, natural capital has many distinguishing features that make it different from all other 
forms of capital. It is essential to human survival and thus has a basic life-support function. Natural 
capital is a necessary input for production, transformable and deployable by everyone. Some forms 
of natural capital are limited in supply and there is irreversibility to their destruction, as natural 
capital such as minerals are not created or produced by humans. Using up natural capital potentially 
causes dangerous waste and pollution, and there is an inbuilt rivalry in consumption: if we consume 
more now, there will be less for future generations. Natural capital comes in many forms: plants, 
species, resources, ecosystems. Some forms of natural capital have more of the distinctive features 
listed above, while others are more substitutable. Because resources are limited – and uncertainty, 
ignorance and ubiquitous risk plague our world – we cannot simply preserve all natural capital. 
Knowing what to preserve is not easy, though: because we do not have perfect information, we also 
cannot say for certain which forms of natural capital should be preserved (Casal 2011: 313, 2012: 
421; Neumayer 1998: 28–9). Natural capital is not equally distributed across people and nations. 
Paula Casal (2011, 2012) also points out that, while the distribution is arbitrary, natural resources 
are easy to redistribute compared to, say, natural talents. Therefore there is no prima facie reason 
for them to be a source of inequalities.  
 
Environmental economics began tackling sustainability in the mid-1970s (gaining mainstream 
popularity in the 1990s) to deal with the issue of how much and in which ways the economy can 
grow without impoverishing the future. Robert Solow (1974: 41) influentially argued that a finite 
pool of resources should be used optimally, but if there is elasticity of substitution between natural 
capital and other capital, the pool can be drawn down as long as the stock of capital is added to. The 
central tenet of weak sustainability is that we can cause pollution and use non-renewable resources 
as long as we compensate for this with enough man-made capital, be it infrastructure, material 
goods, education or advances in medicine. Strong sustainability denies this and maintains that some 
forms of natural capital are non-substitutable, for example that critical forms of natural capital 
should be preserved. In a continuum of sustainability, weak sustainability is associated with a high 
degree of substitutability and therefore a lot of flexibility over what capital to consume, whereas 
strong sustainability is more stringent on substitutability. However, it should be noted that weak 
sustainability is also compatible with some limitations to substitutability.11 Economist Wilfred 
Beckerman (1994: 200) argues that implicit in any definition of sustainability is the idea that any 
substitution of natural capital by man-made capital is only justified if it contributes equally to 
human welfare. Strong sustainability always maintains that some forms of natural capital cannot be 
substituted (perhaps some man-made capital could be branded as non-substitutable also, like unique 
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artworks or historical buildings). John O’Neill (2014) distinguishes between technical and 
economic substitutability. A thing that realises the same purpose or a goal is a technical substitute 
for something (saccharine for sugar). Much of the empirical debate around climate change is about 
technological substitutability. Technical substitutes are not, however, needed if economic 
substitutes are available: substituting A with B does not change the overall welfare of the agent. 
Weak sustainability allows for wide economic substitutability and tends to be linked to high 
technological optimism, unlike strong.  
 
In economics, the essential problem of sustainability is often presented as lack of decisive 
information about what future generations would want us to do: their desires and preferences are 
uncertain to us. Neumayer (2013: 79–80) argues that to defend strong sustainability on empirical 
grounds, “the proponents of strong sustainability would have to show that individuals have 
lexicographic preferences with respect to environmental amenities”, i.e. they display preference of 
environmental capital over other capital, and there just isn’t empirical evidence to back up the 
claim. Contingent valuation surveys do indicate that, regardless of costs, substantial minorities of 
respondents (14–24 per cent of sample) exhibit preferences towards environmental protection. 
However, these still remain minorities and the preferences indicated remain hypothetical. Neumayer 
therefore concludes that without “the acid test of real sacrifices” one cannot infer that strong 
sustainability would in fact be preferred. Daniel W. Bromley (1998) is critical of sustainability and 
laments that it “is at once a fine idea and a hopeless concept”. The present people thus “stand as 
dictators over the future” as our actions violate all three constituents of freedom: autonomy, 
opportunity and immunity with regards to the people who come after us. Our dictatorship concerns 
not so much the amounts of capital to be preserved, but what capital to preserve, what judgements 
will be of value to the future generations. Maintaining choices for future generations restricts 
choices for the present people. What sustainability can be, according to Bromley (1998: 234–9), is 
to provide “suggestion and direction”, but what we should do is a question of ethics. I agree we 
cannot settle the debates of sustainability without basing our arguments on justice.  
 
Usually when natural capital is transformed into man-made capital, it limits the range of options to 
what use it can be put into. It has been observed that natural capital’s paradox “is that the realization 
of its potential is at one and the same time the limitation of its potential” (Holland 1999: 64). 
Therefore a balance between natural and man-made capital should exist: if not, we could be locking 
future generations into a lifestyle of our choice. If we try to act with the best interests of the future 
generations in mind, surely the best course of action is to keep as many options open for them as is 
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feasible. Since we do not know what future generations want or prefer, it is good that they have 
options among which to choose. The question here is not about making the wrong decision for 
future generations; it is about the possibility of exhausting the future generations’ opportunities for 
making any real decisions for themselves. According to Brian Barry (1997: 104–6), we should 
sustain the conditions that make it possible to realise a range of conceptions of what a good life is: 
we should not pre-empt future people’s choices, but instead “respect the creativity of people in the 
future” and maintain equal opportunities across generations. What intergenerational justice 
demands is that we leave the future generations with a range of choices open to them, instead of 
some predefined amount of utility. The current generation is not the sole creator of the majority of 
our capital stock and technology: new generations do not start from scratch. Intergenerational 
justice, then, requires the maintenance of capital as far as possible, and, when this is not feasible, 
the creation of additional capital (including technology) and alternative productive opportunities to 
compensate for the depleted resources and to replace the productive opportunities we have 
destroyed (Barry 1991: 260–9). Clive Spash (1993: 130) argues similarly when he labels the 
intergenerational transfers that occur in daily lives – advances in technology, investments in capital 
and direct bequests – as equity payments that should be made to provide some minimal standard of 
living. According to Spash, long-term environmental damages are not covered by equity payments, 
but present a case for liability responsibilities and corresponding compensation. More recently, 
Joseph Mazor (2010: 408) has argued that present people owe to each other an obligation to 
conserve natural resources for future people, based on a principled commitment to equal shares to 
natural resources among contemporaries and the fact that generations always overlap. The older 
people alive at the moment are thus confronted with demands by their younger contemporaries, who 
in turn “can anticipate being confronted with the demands of the members of the following 
generation and so on”. O’Neill (2014) makes an important observation that we do not only want to 
pass on options, but also particulars: this building, this work of art. The relationship between 
(overlapping) generations is one of deliberation, not of coercion, and the dialogue about the nature 
of good life is ongoing.  
 
Sometimes options should be closed, of course, for example when doing so eliminates a major 
threat. If we were given the option of eradicating AIDS or malaria forever, we should do so. 
However, most of the time when future options are closed, it is for a mundane and simple reason: it 
is simply inevitable. Whenever we make choices, we incur opportunity costs, i.e. we won’t be able 
to enjoy the benefits that the alternatives would have brought us. We cannot help but close a 
number of options for future generations in the course of our lifetimes, while opening others:  
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Certain alternatives that otherwise would be open for choice in the future are 
eliminated by acts performed in the present. This is an inescapable fact of life. But 
another fact of life is that the acts we perform in the present may either increase or 
diminish the freedom of future generations, depending upon which acts we perform. 
As civilization develops, later generations are free from certain natural limitations 
from which earlier generations were not free. (Lemos 1986: 175)  
 
Climate change, however, is not an inescapable fact of life. Climate change – and environmental 
damage more generally – runs a great risk of foreclosing a wide range of opportunities to act out, or 
perhaps even conceive, some versions of a good life for future generations (in a runaway climate 
change scenario, perhaps it may threaten even life itself). Therefore we have to immediately invest 
in mitigation. We could complicate the argument by talking about capabilities as the metric of 
intergenerational justice (Sen 1985; Alkire and Deneulin 2009; Gutwald et al. 2011), but the main 
idea remains the same: intergenerational justice calls for mitigation. In economics, the argument 
could take the form of the value of capital being a function of the opportunities associated with it. 
Since future generations cannot have a common social preference ordering with us, the range of 
choice must be what counts. The range of alternatives in each opportunity set is what allows for 
freedom of choice to be upheld (Perrings 1994: 96–103). Another possible way of formulating this 
argument would be to present climate change as a threat to the liberal idea of neutrality.12 We 
should try to secure conditions to realise pluralistic ways of conceiving the good life, as destroying 
certain physical environments irreversibly narrows options (Dobson 2003: 163–9). We might also 
block future innovations, such as when a plant is found to have new medicinal properties.  
 
Because critical forms of natural capital provide life-support functions, they have lexical priority 
among natural capital. Such critical forms of natural capital include at least ecosystem services – the 
benefits we get from ecosystems – for instance, controlling the climate or providing clean drinking 
water. On the minimal account, intergenerational justice demands that we preserve these for future 
generations. Without mitigating climate change we are running the risk of serious damage for 
example to the Earth’s atmosphere and climate regulation, critical capital that cannot be substituted. 
If we had a time machine that could take into account and calculate all future preferences, this 
would not change the fact that critical forms of natural capital remain non-substitutable, they are not 
optional: they are the backbone of life on Earth. The important point is that sustainability is a 
normative issue, not just a technical optimisation puzzle waiting to be solved.  
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Would you like your sustainability weak, strong or normative, Sir?  
 
This section attempts to separate the normative debate around sustainability from the convoluted 
usage of the terms associated with it. In climate ethics, the debate is essentially about how 
immediate and drastic the action to reduce emissions should be, i.e. how much to invest in 
mitigation efforts. Some of the general debate around weak and strong sustainability (largely 
predating climate ethics and economics) is generated by the genuine difficulty of working in an 
interdisciplinary field, and I have begun to doubt if it is useful to employ the terms in climate ethics 
and economics. Not only do they have a different flavour across disciplines, the problem with using 
such long-debated concepts is that they have come to mean different things to different 
commentators. For example, some use “strong sustainability” to denote the idea that none or very 
few forms of natural capital are substitutable, whereas others link it to the non-substitutability of 
critical forms of natural capital, as we will soon see below. This is why the term normative 
sustainability is introduced, to try to tease out what the weak/strong debate has been about and to 
defend the importance of normativity in climate policy discussions.  
 
Beckerman (1994: 194–5) has criticised strong sustainability as unacceptable and totally 
impractical. He questions the sense of conserving all plant and animal species just for the sake of it, 
and reminds us that about 98 per cent of all species that have existed during Earth’s history are 
already extinct. Still, does anyone lose sleep over dinosaurs? Beckerman brands strong 
sustainability as “an absolutist concept” and “morally repugnant”:  
 
Given the acute poverty and environmental degradation in which a large part of the 
world’s population live, one could not justify using up vast resources in an attempt to 
preserve from extinction, say, every one of the several million species of beetles that 
exist. (Beckerman 1994: 194)  
 
He clearly defines strong sustainability along the lines of keeping natural capital intact. However, 
strong sustainability must not be blind to the differences between types of natural capital. Not all 
natural capital was created equal: some forms are more critical to support life on Earth than others 
and are therefore always non-substitutable. If we save several million species of beetles, it is of no 
use if climate change deteriorates the Earth’s atmosphere. The key is not to exceed the regenerative 
capacity of life-supporting, critical forms of natural capital, so that their function is maintained. 
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Harvesting can be done at the optimally sustainable yield, as long as stocks are not deteriorated. In 
case of sinks, pollution should not exceed the natural absorptive capacity (Neumayer 2013: 26). By 
emphasising the importance of some forms of natural capital over others, this understanding of 
strong sustainability avoids the theoretical pitfalls and practical implausibility of preserving 
everything in nature. As Bromley (1998: 237) puts it, what we should conserve is not species per se 
(that would be species fetishism), but rather “the conditions for the recreation of ecosystems”. This 
is not to ignore the very real difficulty of identifying the forms of natural capital that must be 
preserved, or finding suitable measures and indicators to keep tabs on how well we are doing with 
sustainability.  
 
Beckerman would probably not be satisfied with this response as he has also criticised proponents 
of strong sustainability for failing “to indicate the criteria that are relevant in deciding when one is 
faced with ‘absurdly strong sustainability’ and when one is not – i.e. by what rule does one decide 
when there may be some trade-off, after all” (Beckerman 1995: 175). What he abhors are those who 
claim to know what is good for others without detailed logical arguments, and argues that 
economists show humility to the plurality of values within democratic societies by concentrating on 
individual preferences, while at the same time being aware of the limitations of this approach.  
 
However, with climate change it is clear to see that ecosystem services are already under serious 
threat and the uncertainty that plagues our future calls not just for risk management, but the ethical 
choice of investing substantially in mitigation. In any case, presenting normative arguments does 
not translate into thinking that one occupies some moral high ground and knows what is good for 
others. It is – no more and no less – putting forward an argument about what should or should not 
be done, the strength of which is to be decided in public discourse. What separates normative 
arguments from merely voicing one’s opinion is that the former should come with an explanation of 
their logic attached. There needs to be nothing suspicious about normativity. Quite the contrary, it is 
about facing up to the ethical questions that living together in societies present to us. Normative 
arguments aim to change the way we think and, most importantly, the way we act. They attempt to 
bring the ethical issues that demand an open debate to the front. This is why philosophers can be 
wary of the mask of objectivity that ethical issues can take within economic framework. When new 
circumstances arise, new ethical issues need to be discussed and weighted. This is of course very 
much the case with climate change at the moment.  
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The way sustainability is understood in economics can make it seem somewhat redundant to 
separate weak and strong versions. This is due to both being compatible with limitations to 
substitutability. The difference is that in strong sustainability a normative line is drawn at some 
resource x, depending on the theory, whereas with weak sustainability the non-substitutability of x 
is always an empirical issue. When economists are wary of strong sustainability, they aren’t taking 
a moral stand against conserving critical natural capital. Beckerman (1995: 178) writes that when a 
natural resource becomes scarce “its relative price will rise and this will set up a chain of market 
responses which will tend to discourage its use and encourage the development of substitutes”. He 
continues that, unlike in science fiction, natural resources do not suddenly disappear overnight, and 
therefore societies have time to adapt to changes in demand and supply.  
 
While Beckerman might be right in most cases, does this really apply to sudden changes in the 
ecosystem services, such as the ones caused by anthropogenic climate change? Do the markets 
really have enough time to react, especially as the resource becoming scarce is still (mostly) outside 
the markets? Even if they did, the argument would remain problematical. After all, it is not purely 
an empirical issue whether coal is substitutable by solar power, as clean technology needs initial 
investments to make it a viable alternative. Investments are largely a political decision, as 
government incentives and available infrastructure affect the kind of energy sources it makes 
economic sense to concentrate on. Delaying investments in clean technology is an ethical issue also, 
as mitigation becomes more costly with each passing year. In this way, the substitutability of many 
forms of natural capital becomes an empirical issue only after the fact, after ethical decisions have 
already been taken.  
 
While it may be that in economics weak and strong sustainability collapses into one another, 
philosophically the emphasis between the terms is slightly different. It is not about future shortage 
of some natural capital that is either met or unmet by technological innovations, thus affecting its 
market price and demand and supply. Rather, acknowledging the need to maintain critical natural 
capital like ecosystem services is a normative position about how we are not allowed to knowingly 
jeopardise the lives and well-being of future people. A line is drawn based on normative arguments 
over what is an acceptable harm that can be compensated (what is substitutable, if you like) and 
what is not. Taking an openly normative position, versus belief in the ability of the markets to self-
regulate scarcity with market responses, lies at the heart of much of the interdisciplinary literature 
on strong versus weak sustainability. Due to the various uses of the terms, both of the sides are right 
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in their own way, but the terms also mask this underlying difference across disciplines. There is 
thus a risk that the commentators speak past each other.  
 
This is why I propose the term normative sustainability to refer to the line that can – and should – 
be drawn over what natural capital must be preserved for future generations based on normative 
considerations alone, prior to waiting for market signals over substitutability. Where the line is 
drawn naturally varies between writers, but here it is on risks to critical life-supporting functions. 
Inflicting harm can only be done when it is unavoidable and even then it should be compensated 
for. Harm here means depriving someone of a fundamental interest (Cripps 2013: 10–12).13 On this 
minimal account, fundamental interests can be linked to life-supporting ecosystem services. 
Jeopardising them is a risk too big for us to take. That is why normative sustainability calls for 
urgent and strong mitigation measures on the policy front. Laissez-faire policies based on watch-
and-wait and unrealistically high technological optimism are not acceptable.  
 
 
Why normative arguments about sustainability need not to be unfeasible  
 
This section defends a plausible reading of normative sustainability to anticipate possible 
objections, in order to show that normative arguments based on intergenerational justice need not 
disregard the reality of the world we live in, at least when the concept is applied in climate ethics 
and economics. I begin with some examples of how easily normative arguments can be 
misunderstood.  
 
Economists tend to see themselves as technicians and therefore some of them view normative 
arguments with suspicion. I will use Neumayer as an example of an economist who misconstructs 
normative arguments on sustainability, as he has written a textbook on sustainability that is already 
on its fourth edition. While he bases his analysis on the economic methodology, he is not blind to 
normative issues in economics, and considers – but rejects as implausible – arguments based on 
intergenerational justice by Barry (1991) and Amartya Sen (1984). Neumayer (1999, 2013) claims 
that they brand any action that could inflict harm on future generations as unjustified and non-
compensable. Great opportunity cost is incurred if we decide not to impose any harm on future 
generations. Instead, everything depends on what is the compensatory benefit (Neumayer 1999: 40). 
Neumayer writes: “The verdict that any action that inflicts some harm on coming generations is 
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unjustified and cannot be compensated for calls for a virtual standstill in economic actions of the 
present generation.”  
 
It is worth spending a moment to dispel the misunderstandings in Neumayer’s reading, as they 
represent quite a common line of argument in the sustainability literature in economics. The 
suggestion that philosophers, especially the more environmentally minded ones, are simply widely 
implausible in their recommendations is nothing new. Indeed, if normative sustainability really 
demanded avoiding all possible harm to future generations, they would be worse off as 
technological development would be halted and brakes put on, for example, research on renewable 
energy sources and medicines. Luckily while intergenerational justice arguments might be thin on 
practical recommendations, they need not be implausible. Industrialisation and technological 
advances have raised the living standards, conditions and life-expectancy of people around the 
world (albeit very unequally), reducing human suffering and making human flourishing possible on 
a wider scale than ever possible, with the possibility for much more. Normative sustainability 
simply requires that we take the (however unintended, or conveniently ignored) negative effects of 
these developments seriously, and do not ignore environmental pollution and degradation. The 
gravest one of the long-term harm caused is climate change, and it might even have the power to 
wipe out the gains development has brought. Of course it matters if natural capital is converted into 
things that benefit humankind now and in the long run, such as education for girls or medical 
advances, instead of some activity with short-lasting benefits conferred upon only a few individuals. 
Still not everything is up for grabs: future generations will not be compensated by bigger homes, 
smarter phones or even advances in medicine if climatic stability is jeopardised.  
 
Neumayer’s criticism of Barry and Sen seems to be based on misreading the normative arguments 
he considers. Sen argues that long-term environmental pollution resulting of deliberate action could 
be seen as a form of oppression of present generations towards future generations (Sen 1984: 194–
6; Sen’s 1982 paper quoted by Neumayer is republished in Sen 1984). According to Neumayer, Sen 
ignores the reality of trade-offs. When quoting Sen to support his point, Neumayer importantly 
omits the original quote’s last sentence: “The avoidance of oppression of the future generations has 
to be given a value of its own” (Sen 1984: 195). This points to considerations of foreseeable, lasting 
harm being taken properly into account, but not necessarily overruling everything. In fact, Sen 
(1984: 199) writes that he does not doubt that compromises can be reached. While Sen was quoted 
out of context, Barry’s argument is completely misrepresented by Neumayer. Neumayer (1999: 40) 
claims that, according to Barry, any environmental damage imposed on future generations 
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represents a harm that is both unjustified and not amenable to compensation.14 To support this 
conclusion, he quotes the example Barry (1991: 264) gives about how doing harm is in general not 
cancelled out by doing good, and how doing some good does not license one to do harm:  
 
For example, if you paid for the realignments of a dangerous highway intersection and 
saved an average of two lives a year, that would not mean that you could shoot one 
motorist per year and simply reckon on coming out ahead.  
 
However, Barry clarifies that the above example involves “gratuitous infliction of harm” and that 
the argument does not apply to resources. His claim is only that not all violations of rights can be 
acceptably compensated. Barry (1991: 264) continues:  
 
In the case of resources and future generations, the crucial feature is that we cannot 
possibly avoid harming them by using up some non-renewable resources … the choice 
is not between reducing the resource base for future generations and keeping it intact, 
but between depletion with compensation and depletion without compensation.  
 
Part of the confusion might stem from Neumayer and Barry not spelling out what they mean by 
harm: I suspect Neumayer’s conception of harm might be wider than Barry’s. In any case, Barry is 
clearly not advocating some kind of a standstill in economic actions of the present generations. 
Quite the contrary, Barry (1991: 265) writes that it is possible that “in the absence of resource 
depletion, we would in fact be inclined to leave future generations with far less productive potential 
than, as a matter of justice, we ought to leave them with”. Barry thus fully acknowledges the 
importance of human capital creation: that the generations before us have added to the capital stock 
that was passed on to us, and that this “thousands of years of technological development” has left us 
better off (Barry 1991: 266).  
 
One more clarification is required to make clear what is not being proposed. Neumayer (2013: 8–
10) defines sustainability as development that is able to maintain the capacity necessary to provide 
non-declining future utility (per capita utility for infinity). But the idea of non-declining future 
utility is neither convincing nor necessary. Bromley (1998: 238) asserts that the idea “that those of 
us now alive can never be better off than any representative future generation” places the current 
people “in a situation of guilt and insecurity”. Here we are agreed. It is not irrelevant to 
intergenerational justice what the starting point of welfare is. But it is not possible to agree with 
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Barry (1997: 106) writing that “unless people in the future can be held responsible for the situation 
that they find themselves in, they should not be worse off than we are”.  
 
To illustrate why I cannot agree, this scenario shows why it would be strange to demand that the 
baseline can never go down. Imagine some 25-year-period in the future where crop yields across the 
globe exceed all expectations. This could be due to exceptionally advantageous weather conditions 
caused by some planetary movements, but in any case something that is outside of human control. 
Previous records are broken everywhere and food supplies are plentiful, allowing for labour 
normally spent on agriculture to be utilised elsewhere. Once the weather conditions return to 
normal, why should there be any intergenerational injustice attached to the next generation not 
having it quite so easy anymore? This is not to argue that any kind of drop between generations is 
acceptable: at minimum, we should always aim to secure fundamental interests. Capabilities is 
(again) one route to try to flesh this out, and could be helped to identify what kind of options we 
should try to keep open, or try to obtain, for future generations. Inequality among people, or 
generations, who all do very well, is much less of a problem than inequality among people of whom 
some are seriously struggling while others have plenty. This is why it is unnecessary to demand that 
future generations must always be at least as well off as the present generation and therefore non-
declining future utility would be misleading as a principle of intergenerational justice. Alas, this is 
(sadly) not a concern for the present moment, as we are very far away from a world where all are 
doing well, or even close to such a world.  
 
 
Concluding remarks  
 
Intergenerational justice demands that we invest in climate change mitigation considerably to 
preserve non-substitutable ecosystem services, and also aim to leave as many options open for 
future generations as is feasible. Normative sustainability requires that, at minimum, critical forms 
of natural capital should be preserved, and that inflicting harm can only be done when it is 
unavoidable, and even then it should be compensated for. How substantial should investment into 
mitigation be then? While this is a question for politics, the costliness of mitigation is relative: 
according to the latest IPCC report the financial sacrifices of the current generation would, for 
example, be below the recent spending on saving banks in the financial crisis.  
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Where, then, does this leave cost–benefit analyses in climate economics? We should not get rid of 
them completely; carefully done they can throw light on areas that require more work and help to 
identify problematic assumptions. As Robert C. Lind (1982: 24) put it, cost–benefit analysis “need 
not and cannot provide precise answers to policy questions. Rather it is a procedure that can provide 
a crude but highly useful picture of the relative merits of alternative policies.” While welfare 
economists are aware that market prices are not perfect price signals (the difficult task of 
determining shadow prices for goods is a way of trying to represent the full social cost), non-
substitutability does not get its proper attention. As discounting presupposes substitutability, non-
substitutability of critical natural capital reveals the limits to its usefulness. Because of this, and 
other problematic assumptions (such as endless growth), the ethical assumptions and normative 
choices made in the calculations that compare different mitigation options should be made 
transparent. Policymakers and those who use cost–benefit analyses to guide their decision-making 
should be made fully aware of what they are comparing.  
 
In any case, discretion is required in using cost–benefit analyses. They should never be viewed as 
neutral tools for policymakers, as normative considerations always come into choosing the discount 
rate and in deciding whether this can be uniform across different types of capital. This chapter does 
not claim that economists are unaware of the value judgements that go into making cost–benefit 
analyses. But the way they are utilised in the political arena with regards to climate change belies 
the not-so-objective nature of economics. The ethical choices that go into making the formulas 
should be spelled out and there should be honesty about the moral implications of different options. 
In other words, these calculations should come with a warning about their limited applicability. 
Political decision-making will most definitely be needed and not all decisions around mitigation and 
adaptation will be easy. Awkward trade-off decisions cannot be avoided and it is unlikely that a 
neat, clear formula can be discovered that would cover all cases. However, the requirements of 
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